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Many U.S. banks have tried to take advantage of and contrib-
ute to economic growth in developing countries by establishing
branches in foreign nations.' When political and economic condi-
tions become unstable, foreign governments have on occasion ex-
propriated the branches' assets. Depositors unable to withdraw
their funds because of the expropriation may attempt to recover
from the U.S. bank's home office. -
A depositor's ability to recover ultimately depends on the
court's choice of law. If U.S. law applies, the depositor usually can
recover, because the bank has not repaid its debt to the depositor.
Conversely, if foreign law applies, the depositor usually loses be-
cause the foreign government's expropriation carries the force of
law and extinguishes the debt. Instead of analyzing these foreign
branch deposit cases under conflict of laws principles, however, the
courts have emphasized two doctrines developed in other contexts.
t A.B. 1987, M.A. 1989, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of
Chicago.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System defines a "foreign branch" as
"an office of an organization ... that is located outside the country under the laws of which
the organization is established, at which a banking or financing business is conducted." 12
CFR § 211.2(h) (1990).
2 A related problem, not explicitly considered here, may arise when a foreign sovereign
restricts the flow of foreign currency by imposing exchange controls. See, for example, Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd. v Citibank, 852 F2d 657 (2d Cir 1988) (recoverability of Eurodollar time
deposits placed in the Manila branch of a U.S. bank affected by Phillipine government ex-
change controls), vacated and remanded, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990); Peter S. Smedresman and
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 NYU L
Rev 733 (1989).
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One of these, the ultimate liability doctrine (and its exception the
separate entity doctrine), is derived from banking cases litigated
during the 1920s. The other, the act of state doctrine, is a quasi-
constitutional rule applied in international disputes concerning the
actions of a foreign sovereign. These doctrines unnecessarily com-
plicate what would otherwise be a relatively straightforward choice
of law analysis. Through territorial debt situs analysis, they require
courts to attempt to-"localize" the transaction in a mechanical way
without explicitly considering its actual contacts with the different
jurisdictions involved.
Neither of these doctrines is itself a choice of law principle,
but both have choice of law implications. The approaches reflect a
background theory of territoriality, which requires application of
the law of the jurisdiction in which the dispute's subject matter
was located. Strict territoriality, applied under the rubric of debt
situs analysis in foreign branch deposit cases, was once the domi-
nant approach to all choice of law problems but has been largely
superseded by interest analysis.
To resolve foreign branch deposit cases in a manner that is
both clear and consistent with contemporary jurisprudence, courts
must first recognize that such cases present a classic conflict of
laws problem. Second, courts should resolve this problem as they
would any other conflict of laws problem: by explicitly considering
and balancing the interests of the affected jurisdictions.
Section I of this Comment presents the territorial doctrines
used to resolve recent foreign branch deposit cases. Section II then
explains how the parties in such cases may raise those doctrines
and describes the analyses employed by courts in recent cases. Sec-
tion III argues that the real problem in these cases is one of con-
flict of laws and that courts should treat it as such, and explains
how the doctrines currently employed in foreign branch deposit
cases operate as territorial choice of law rules.
Section IV critiques the approach courts have taken in recent
foreign branch deposit cases by emphasizing the inappropriateness
of debt situs analysis and demonstrating that contemporary choice
of law jurisprudence prefers interest analysis to strict territorial
analysis. Section V proposes that courts faced with foreign branch
deposit cases abandon the anachronistic territorial approach in
favor of explicit interest analysis.
I. TERRITORIAL DOCTRINES IN FOREIGN BRANCH DEPOSIT CASES
Foreign branch deposit cases frequently turn on the choice be-
tween U.S. and foreign banking law. While U.S. state law generally
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enables a depositor to recover on a contract theory, 3 foreign law,
and perhaps U.S. federal law as well, are more likely to favor the
bank, as discussed in Section V. Instead of approaching this crucial
choice of law inquiry directly, courts have relied on several unre-
lated territorial doctrines. These doctrines arose in contexts other
than conflict of laws. Each relies on the principle of strict territori-
ality. First, the strict territorial sovereignty principle embodied in
the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws attempts to define and
respect territorial jurisdictional limits. Second, the ultimate liabil-
ity and separate entity doctrines of U.S. banking law attempt to
apportion responsibilities between banks' home offices and their
branches. Finally, the act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts
from examining the validity of certain acts of foreign sovereigns.
A. Territorial Sovereignty and the First Restatement of Conflicts
At the heart of the doctrinal analysis performed in foreign
branch deposit cases is the assumption that, if only the territorial
nexus of a transaction or event can be discovered, the case can be
resolved simply by applying the law of that jurisdiction. Though
rarely articulated, this belief harkens back to an earlier day when
all conflict of laws questions were approached in terms of
localization.4
In the mid-nineteenth century, Justice Joseph Story wrote the
authoritative U.S. treatise on the conflict of laws.5 Story founded
his conception of the conflict of laws on a notion of strict territorial
sovereignty:
It is plain, that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic
force ... except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of
that country. They can bind only its own subjects, and others,
who are within its jurisdictional limits; and the latter only
while they remain there. No other nation, or its subjects, are
bound to yield the slightest obedience to those laws.'
Story's view formed the basis for the First Restatement of
Conflicts, edited by Joseph Henry Beale, which attempted to pro-
3 See 5B Michie on Banks and Banking § 350 at 391, 394-95 (Michie, 1983).
For an overview of the development of conflict of laws doctrine in Europe and the
United States, see Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2
Am J Comp L 297 (1953), reprinted in Association of American Law Schools, Selected
Readings on Conflict of Laws 30 (West, 1956) ("AALS Readings").
' Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Hilliard, Gray, 1834)
("Commentaries").
6 Id, §7 at 7.
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
vide specific guidance to courts faced with conflict of laws cases by
relying on the notion of exclusive territorial sovereignty.' Such an
approach forces courts to "localize" events with multistate con-
tacts-a daunting task. To this end, the Restatement divided the
law into categories such as status, corporations, property, con-
tracts, and wrongs,' and further broke down each category into
topics. The Restatement established rigid rules for each topic that
decreed "where" a particular event would be deemed to have taken
place. Because these localization rules served merely to select a ju-
risdiction whose law would then be construed, theoretically with-
out prior reference to the content of that law, they came to be
known (somewhat pejoratively) as "jurisdiction-selecting" rules.9
Over time, however, courts and commentators realized that
the Restatement's jurisdiction-selecting rules made no attempt to
determine which jurisdiction's laws should govern the dispute.'0 As
a result, when the rules dictated irrational results, courts invoked
one of a variety of escape devices, allowing them to apply their
state's law to the cases that were particularly important to it."
Such widespread use of escape devices defeated the Restatement's
purpose within a few years of its publication. Although later juris-
prudence, including the Second Restatement of Conflicts, has
partly moved away from jurisdiction-selecting rules, 2 the strict
territoriality principle continues to be reflected in the doctrines ap-
plied in foreign branch deposit cases.
B. The Ultimate Liability and Separate Entity Doctrines
The ultimate liability doctrine s holds banks responsible as
unitary enterprises for the debts incurred by their branches or sep-
See, for example, Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 98 (1934).
8 See id, Table of Contents at xxii-xxxiii.
' The phrase comes from David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,
47 Harv L Rev 173 (1933).
10 Id at 178, 180-81.
" For examples of many of the escape devices (including the traditional catch-all,
"public policy"), see cases cited in Roger C. Cramton, David P. Currie, and Herma Hill Kay,
Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments-Questions 58-135 (West, 4th ed 1987). The idea that
these escape devices implicitly furthered the interests of the forum is explicated in Brainerd
Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke, 1963).
12 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2) (1971).
12 Although courts have long held a bank's home office ultimately liable for the debts of
its offices, this rule has never been referred to by any particular name. For ease of reference,
this Comment adopts the language of Trinh v Citibank, 850 F2d 1164, 1168 (6th Cir 1984)
(discussed in Section II.B.1.), and refers to this concept as the ultimate liability doctrine.
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arately incorporated subsidiaries. 14 This doctrine recognizes that
banks conduct business at many locations, but attributes all debts
to the firm as a single enterprise. 15 The rationale is that branches
"are subject to the supervision and control of the parent bank, and
are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank carries on its busi-
ness,... and their business conduct and policies are controlled by
the parent bank, and their property and assets belong to the par-
ent bank. .". ."' The choice of law effect of the doctrine is to make
the law of the bank's principal place of business the law that gov-
erns the recoverability of any debt owed by the bank.
In the 1920s, the New York courts carved out an exception to
ultimate liability known as the separate entity doctrine. 7 That
doctrine treats each branch and the bank's main office as separate
and distinct business entities for the purpose of some arm's-length
commercial transactions.' 8 An important implication of the doc-
trine is that deposits maintained at one branch are payable only at
that branch and may not normally be demanded by the depositor
or her creditors at the bank's main office or at any other branch.' 9
The separate entity analysis dictates that a debt's situs (territorial
location) is in the jurisdiction where the branch is located.20
The separate entity doctrine developed in response to the dif-
ficulty of interbranch communication before the days of instant
telecommunication and global computer networks. If a depositor
banked at one particular branch, the records of her accounts (in-
cluding the authorized signature card and the record of daily bal-
ances) were not readily accessible to tellers at other branches. Al-
lowing depositors to demand payment at any branch would have
imposed onerous burdens on banks to maintain records of every
14 The main case involving foreign branches is Sokoloff v National City Bank of New
York, 130 Misc 66, 224 NYS 102, 114 (S Ct 1927), aff'd mem, 223 AD 754, 227 NYS 907,
aft'd, 250 NY 69, 164 NE 745 (1928). The principle had earlier been established in the con-
text of domestic branches. See Bank of United States v Goddard, 2 F Cas 694, 696 (CC D
Mass 1829); Worth v Bank of New Hanover, 122 NC 397, 403, 29 SE 775, 776 (1898). See
also Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 L & Pol Intl Bus 903, 924-30 (1979).
" See Heininger, 11 L & Pol Intl Bus at 924-30 (cited in note 14).
14 Sokoloff, 130 Misc at 73. See also 10.Am Jur 2d Banks §§ 326, 327. Heininger de-
scribes this concept as "a general principle of corporate responsibility." Heininger, 11 L &
Pol Intl Bus at 924 (cited in note 14).
17 The separate entity doctrine was first enunciated in Chrzanowska v Corn Exchange
Bank, 173 AD 285, 291, 159 NYS 385 (1916).
IS Id at 291; Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v Gomez, 139 Misc 742, 744 (City Ct NY
1931) ("the branch is not a mere 'teller's window'; it is a separate business entity").
1' Bluebird Undergarment, 139 Misc at 744.
See id at 743-45.
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account at each branch, and to require each branch to check with
every other before paying out funds from an account. Moreover, if
a depositor could demand payment on the same funds from two
branches, and was able to make the second demand before a record
of the first had reached the second branch, the bank could face
double liability.21
Like the ultimate liability doctrine, the separate entity doc-
trine spawned its own exceptions. 22 The most important of these
for foreign branch deposit cases holds that the separate entity rule
does not apply when the branch has been closed or has wrongfully
refused payment.23 In those circumstances, the situs of the debt is
deemed to have "sprung back" to the bank's head office, thus rein-
voking the ultimate liability rule.24
C. The Act of State Doctrine
Another principle applied by the courts in foreign branch de-
posit cases is the act of state doctrine, which prohibits a U.S. court
from reviewing certain acts of a foreign sovereign.25 In a typical act
of state case, the plaintiff challenges the title to property, alleging
that the means by which the foreign government obtained the
property (expropriation) was invalid and thus undeserving of rec-
21 See Cronan v Schilling, 100 NYS2d 474, 476 (S Ct NY County 1950); Newtown
Jackson Co. v Animashaun, 148 NYS2d 66, 68 (S Ct Nassau County 1955).
22 See, for example, Shinto Shipping Co. v Fibrex & Shipping Co., 425 F Supp 1088,
1091 (N D Cal 1976) (with regard to subpoenas seeking information about accounts in
branch banks, "if due to the interplay of the laws of interested states manifest injustice or
inordinate hardship might attend this rule's application to an interstate banking system, an
exception should be recognized"), aff'd, 572 F2d 1328 (9th Cir 1978).
23 Sokoloff, 130 Misc at 73.
24 Vishipco Line v Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F2d 854, 862 (2d Cir 1981), quot-
ing Heininger, 11 L & Pol Intl Bus at 975 (cited in note 14).
" The modern version of the doctrine was articulated by Justice Harlan in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398, 401 (1964): "The act of state doctrine in its tradi-
tional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of
the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory."
The "classic American statement of the act of state doctrine," id at 416, was announced by
the Court in Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.
Nonetheless, the doctrine does not operate to deprive a court of jurisdiction over a dispute.
It merely requires a U.S. court to accept the act of a foreign sovereign as a "rule of deci-
sion." W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S Ct 701, 704 (1990),
quoting Ricaud v American Metal Co,, 246 US 304, 310 (1918).
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ognition and enforcement by U.S. courts.2" A foreign action might
be denied legal effect in this country if, for example, it violated the
U.S. public policy against expropriation without compensation, as
courts have often held with regard to confiscatory decrees not cov-
ered by the act of state doctrine.
Before applying the act of state doctrine, a court must find
that the foreign government's act was public,28 committed by a rec-
ognized foreign sovereign, 29 and committed within the territory of
the foreign sovereign. 0 Only when these three requirements are
met will U.S. courts refrain from passing on the validity of the act
in question .3  The most important of these requirements in the for-
eign branch deposit context is the third: the act of the foreign state
must have been committed within its own territory. This is usually
referred to as the "situs requirement" because the court must find
that the objects of expropriation were within the foreign state at
the time the act was committed. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v
2' See, for example, Sabbatino, 376 US 398; Ricaud, 246 US 304; Oetjen v Central
Leather Co., 246 US 297 (1918). But note that the first instance of the act of state doctrine
in U.S. law involved allegations of tortious injury by a foreign government official. Un-
derhill, 168 US 250.
"7 See, for example, Republic of Iraq v First National City Bank, 353 F2d 47, 51 (2d
Cir 1965).
18 See, for example, Sabbatino, 376 US 398, and cases cited therein at 416-18; Ricaud,
246 US 304; Oetjen, 246 US 297.
2 Although Sabbatino explicitly stated that the foreign government must be "extant
and recognized by this country at the time of suit," 376 US at 428, later courts have largely
ignored this requirement. The idea that only acts of recognized governments were subject to
the doctrine was suggested in earlier cases involving expropriations by the Soviet govern-
ment prior to U.S. recognition. See, for example, Sokoloff, 250 NY at 81. Sabbatino's em-
phasis of the existence and recognition requirement was prompted by the need to explain an
earlier controversial case involving the expropriation of Jewish citizens' property by the
German government before and during World War II. See Bernstein v N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F2d 375 (2d Cir 1964), in which the Second
Circuit found the doctrine inapplicable following receipt of a letter from the State Depart-
ment urging such a result. The Bernstein exception remained controversial even following
Sabbatino's attempt to explain it away on different grounds. See First National City Bank
v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 US 759 (1972).
30 The problem of the situs of the property subject to the foreign government's act is
crucial to the resolution of foreign branch deposit cases and is treated at length below. See
Section IV.A.
S In the modern era, the Supreme Court has rarely reached a consensus (or even a
majority) on the doctrine's purpose or the limits of its application. In First National City
Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 US 759 (1972), the three-member plurality decided
the case on a ground that the concurrence and the dissent (amounting to six justices) re-
jected outright. The three opinions are irreconcilable. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v Chase
Manhattan Bank, 658 F2d 875, 884 (2d Cir 1981). Similarly, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v Republic of Cuba, 425 US 682 (1976), also failed to produce a majority opinion. But see
Kirkpatrick, 110 S Ct 701.
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Sabbatino,2 and most early act of state cases,3 3 this situs analysis
was simple because the expropriated property was usually either
real or movable. The U.S. court simply asked where the property
was physically located at the time the foreign state acted. If the
property was within the country's borders, the act of state was
complete. Otherwise, the court could decline to give extraterritorial
effect to the expropriation, usually on public policy grounds.3 4
Where the property is not tangible, however, the act is far more
difficult to localize.
The act of state doctrine has traditionally rested on avoiding
the embarrassment to the executive branch that could result if
courts applied the public policy exception to official acts of foreign
states.3 5 The embarrassment concern is twofold. First, interna-
tional comity may require the United States to acknowledge offi-
cial acts of coequal sovereigns.36 Second, the constitutional system
of separation of powers commits the conduct of foreign relations to
the executive branch, and courts should not interfere with this
constitutional mandate by deciding cases that could embarrass the
executive.37 The act of state doctrine thus resembles both choice of
law principles 8 and the political question doctrine,39 although
these concerns are not necessarily exclusive or inconsistent." The
32 376 US 398 (1964).
33 See, for example, Ricaud, 246 US 304; Oetjen, 246 US 297.
3' "Public policy" was a traditional escape device invoked under the First Restatement
of Conflicts and earlier jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rules. See, for example, Loucks v
Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 NY 99, 110, 120 NE 198, 201 (1918); see also Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 90. The act of state doctrine, however, trumps the
public policy exception and mandates that the U.S. court give effect to the action in spite of
(in fact, because of-as there would otherwise be no need for the rule) the fact that it would
contravene the American forum's public policy against expropriation without compensation.
See Republic of Iraq v First National City Bank, 353 F2d 47, 51 (2d Cir 1965); Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 443, Reporters' Note 1 (1987);
Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 Colum J Transnatl L
175, 178 (1967).
15 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 443,
comment a.
's This justification for.the doctrine proceeds from the reasoning of Underhill. See Di-
ane P. Wood, Government Involvement and International Antitrust Enforcement, Pro-
ceedings of Fordham Corporate Law Institute 17, 24 (Matthew Bender, 1988) ("Government
Involvement"). Note, however, that Sabbatino claimed the doctrine was not required either
by international law or by comity. 376 US at 421-22.
17 See Sabbatino, 376 US at 423-24, 431-32.
18 See Dunhill, 425 US at 725-27 (Marshall dissenting).
39 See First National City Bank, 406 US at 787-88 (Brennan dissenting).
" See Wood, Government Involvement at 25 (cited in note 36) ("Nothing in Sabbatino
rejects comity as an equally important factor for a properly restricted act of state
doctrine.").
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effect, however, of refusing to examine the validity of an act of
state is systematically to choose the foreign state's law.41
II. FOREIGN BRANCH DEPOSIT CASES
A. A Typical Case
When a foreign government expropriates a U.S. bank's foreign
branch assets, the branch's depositors are unable to withdraw
those funds directly from the branch. In most cases, the expropria-
tion is the act of a revolutionary government not particularly sym-
pathetic to the concerns of depositors, so there is little recourse
available from the country's central bank or other governmental
entities charged with carrying on the business of the expropriated
foreign branches.
To recover the expropriated funds, depositors often sue in
U.S. federal court or in a court of the state where the bank is'
chartered or has its principal place of business. To prevail, the de-
positor must convince the court that the parent bank itself is re-
sponsible for the debts incurred by its foreign branch. Conse-
quently, the depositor relies explicitly on the ultimate liability
doctrine.
The bank may offer a number of defenses. First, casting the
case as a choice of law problem, the bank may assert that foreign,
not U.S., law applies to the dispute, and that foreign law prevents
recovery, an assumption usually supported by the fact of the ex-
propriation itself. Indeed, revolutionary decrees announcing expro-
priation policies often explicitly carry the force of law and would
be enforced by the new government's judicial system in spite of
their possible inconsistency with the laws or policies of the former
regime. U.S. courts are prohibited from finding that the expropria-
tion violated the foreign state's own law.42 This defense invokes the
jurisdiction-selecting strict territorial model of the First
Restatement.
A second defense the U.S. bank may offer is that the parent
bank should not be held liable for the debts at issue. This defense
implicitly assumes that U.S. law applies to the dispute, and looks
to the intricate structure of the ultimate liability and separate en-
41 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 443, Re-
porters' Note 1.
41 This is the lesson of the early act of state cases. See Banco de Espana v Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 114 F2d 438, 443 (2d Cir 1940) (citing Underhill, Oetjen, and
Ricaud).
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tity doctrines. The bank will claim that the branch should be con-
sidered a separate entity whose debts should not be imputed to the
parent.
Finally, the bank may assert that the case turns on the valid-
ity of a public act of a foreign sovereign and so must be governed
by the act of state doctrine. If applicable, this doctrine prevents
U.S. courts from reviewing the expropriation, effectively absolving
the bank from liability. This defense may work in conjunction with
the first one. Choice of foreign law might be defeated by invoking
public policy against expropriation, but the act of state doctrine
prevents inquiry into the foreign sovereign's act.43
None of these defenses is immediately dispositive of the claim.
With regard to choice of law, the depositor can argue that U.S. law
should apply, whether because of significant contacts with this
country or because the parties reasonably expected, or even agreed,
that it would.44 In response to the separate entity defense, the de-
positor may invoke the "spring back" exception, which requires
payment by the parent when the branch has closed or otherwise
wrongfully refused payment. Countering the act of state doctrine,
the depositor may claim that the court need not review the validity
of the foreign act in order to find the bank liable.45
The depositor's strongest responses, like the bank's strongest
defenses, all rely on the debt's situs. If the depositor can prove
that the situs of the debt was in the United States, the court will
probably apply U.S. law, find the bank ultimately liable, and hold
the act of state doctrine inapplicable. Of course, a finding that the
debt's situs was in the foreign state is not dispositive, but it would
resolve the most powerful objections to the bank's defenses. Thus,
virtually the entire case, including intricacies of three separate ar-
eas of law, turns on the speculative task of locating the "situs" of
the debt.
B. Recent Foreign Branch Deposit Cases
Five recent cases have involved depositors' attempts to recover
foreign branch deposits after expropriation by a foreign -govern-
ment. Two of these involved claims by Vietnamese nationals
against U.S. banks that closed their Saigon branches shortly before
the fall of the South Vietnamese government. The courts relied
43 See note 34.
4 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws vii-viii.
45 See Kirkpatrick, 110 S Ct at 704.
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primarily on the interaction of the ultimate liability and separate
entity doctrines. The other three cases involved claims against a
U.S. bank that closed its Havana branch when Fidel Castro nation-
alized the banks. The Cuban cases were decided primarily on the
act of state doctrine's situs requirement. Taken as a whole, these
five cases reflect dissatisfaction with the territoriality principle, yet
only one court attempted to use a method other than the ultimate
liability, separate entity, and act of state doctrines.
1. The Vietnamese cases.
Vishipco Line v Chase Manhattan Bank46 and Trinh v Ci-
tibank47 involved claims against large U.S. banks based on the
banks' closure of their Saigon branches just days before the South
Vietnamese government fell in 1975.48 In both cases, the plaintiffs
were South Vietnamese nationals when they made the deposits
and U.S. residents by the time they brought suit.4 9 In both cases,
*the courts held the banks liable under the ultimate liability doc-
trine. In Vishipco, the court explicitly applied New York law to
the dispute.5 0 In Trinh, although the court claimed to apply
Vietnamese law, it in fact relied on the American ultimate liability
principle, and referred extensively to Vishipco's analysis. 5
To avoid the effect of the separate entity doctrine, both courts
emphasized that the defendants had closed their Saigon branches
before the South Vietnamese government fell and the new govern-
ment nationalized the banks.5 2 The Vishipco court found that the
situs of the debt sprang back to Chase's home office in New York
once the Saigon branch ceased operations.5 3 Likewise, the Trinh
46 660 F2d 854 (2d Cir 1981).
47 850 F2d 1164 (6th Cir 1988).
48 Two other cases alleging similar facts, filed after Trinh and Vishipco, were dismissed
by the federal district court as barred by New York's statute of limitations. Tat Ba v Chase
Manhattan Bank, 616 F Supp 10 (S D NY 1984), aff'd without opinion, 762 F2d 991 (2d Cir
1985); Ngoc Dung Thi Tran v Citibank, 586 F Supp 203 (S D NY 1983).
" 850 F2d at 1166; 660 F2d at 856-57. Trinh v Citibank, 623 F Supp 1526, 1529 (E D
Mich 1985).
50 660 F2d at 860.
"1 The Trinh court's situs determination allowed it to claim to apply the law of South
Vietnam (prior to the institution of the revolutionary government) and to ignore the effect
under Vietnamese law of the expropriation decree. 850 F2d at 1167-71. The court inter-
preted the law of South Vietnam, based on what seems to be scanty and equivocal evidence,
as consistent with its analysis of the American ultimate liability doctrine. Id at 1169.
61 850 F2d at 1166; 660 F2d at 862.
660 F2d at 862, quoting Heininger, 11 L & Pol Intl Bus at 975 (cited in note 14).
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court emphasized that "one of the 'special circumstances' trigger-
ing liability against the home office is the closing of a branch. '54
The two courts also avoided the act of state'doctrine through
their situs analysis. Vishipco followed the often-repeated rule that
a debt's situs is in a foreign country only if "that state has the
power to enforce or collect it."55 Trinh applied the same rule and
specifically interpreted the new Vietnamese government's decree
nationalizing banks as applying only to the bank's assets, not to its
liabilities. Because Citibank had closed its Saigon branch before
the decree was issued, the decree had no effect on the branch's
debts to depositors. The liability for those debts had already
sprung back to Citibank's home office.56 Consequently, the act of
state doctrine could not apply. Both cases used the same basic ap-
proach to decide the dispute.
2. The Cuban cases.
Garcia v Chase Manhattan Bank,57 Perez v Chase Manhattan-
Bank,5" and Edelmann v Chase Manhattan Bank59 involved at-
tempts to recover on certificates of deposit (CDs) purchased from
Chase's Cuban branches before Fidel Castro's rise to power in
1959, and his government's nationalization of banks in 1960. On
identical facts, and apparently proceeding under the same situs in-
quiry, the Garcia and Perez courts reached opposite conclusions.
Both courts relied on the formulation that a debt is governed by
the law of the place where it is to be repaid. In both cases, Cuban
nationals bought Chase CDs in Cuba with the understanding that
they could be redeemed, in dollars, at qny Chase branch world-
wide. In Garcia, these facts led the Second Circuit to rule that
the depositor should recover, while in Perez, the New York Court
of Appeals held that the bank should prevail.
The court in Garcia considered the effect of the Cuban gov-
ernment's nationalization decree and found that it did not relieve
850 F2d at 1168-69 (emphasis in original).
55 660 F2d at 862, quoting Menendez v Saks & Co., 485 F2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir 1973),
rev'd on other grounds as Alfred Dunhill of London v Republic of Cuba, 425 US 682 (1976).
The court also noted that this requirement follows from the rule in Harris v Balk, 198 US
215 (1905) (power to enforce payment of a debt depends on jurisdiction over the debtor),
overruled (with respect to personal jurisdiction) by Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186 (1977).
STrinh, 850 F2d at 1171-72.
.7 735 F2d 645 (2d Cir 1984).
61 NY2d 460, 463 NE2d 5 (1984).
" 861 F2d 1291 (1st Cir 1988).
10 Garcia, 735 F2d at 646-47; Perez, 463 NE2d at 6.
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Chase from liability on the debt owed its depositors.61 The court
did not explicitly consider the ultimate liability or the separate en-
tity doctrines, but it did quote Vishipco's statement that Chase
"'accepted the risk that it would be liable elsewhere for obligations
incurred by its branch.' ,162 The Garcia court found that the act of
state doctrine did not apply because the situs of the debt was not
wholly within Cuba at the time of the decree.6 3 Because the CD
was redeemable anywhere in the world, the court found that the
situs requirement had not been completely met; U.S. courts were
thus not precluded from reviewing the validity of the Cuban
decree.
On the same facts, the Perez court held that "[o]nly when a
debt or other obligation is not payable at all in the confiscating
State would the Act of State doctrine be inapplicable." 64 Because
the debt could have been redeemed in Cuba, the court found that
the act of state doctrine prevented any inquiry into the effect of
the expropriation decree. For the Perez court, the debt situs analy-
sis under the act of state doctrine was dispositive; it did not ad-
dress the role of the ultimate liability and separate entity
doctrines.
In Edelmann, the First Circuit held in favor of the depositor.
Instead of focusing on the ultimate liability, separate entity, or act
of state doctrine, however, the court proceeded with a straightfor-
ward choice of law analysis according to principles set forth in the
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws." By analyzing a number
of factors in its choice of law decision, the court concluded that
New York law should apply and that the depositor was thus enti-
tled to recover from Chase's home office.
III. THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEM
The fundamental question in foreign branch deposit cases is
whether U.S. or foreign law should govern the dispute. The ulti-
mate liability, separate entity, and act of state doctrines all at-
tempt to resolve this question by "localizing" the transaction in
either the place where the parent bank has its home office or the
place where the branch is located. These doctrines all implicate
61 735 F2d at 649.
62 Id at 650, quoting Vishipco, 660 F2d at 863.
63 Id at 650-51.
" 463 NE2d at 9 (emphasis added).
15 861 F2d at 1295, citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2). For the
court's cursory rejection of the act of state doctrine, see 861 F2d at 1302-04.
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analysis of the debt's situs. They ultimately operate in these cases
as conflict of laws rules, even though they were developed in other
contexts for other purposes.
Although the ultimate liability and separate entity doctrines
were not originally developed as conflict of laws rules, they have
the effect of mandating a certain choice of law outcome when ap-
plied in foreign branch deposit cases. The ultimate liability doc-
trine exhibits the characteristics of a territorial localizing rule by
resolving which of multiple jurisdictions will regulate the outcome
of a dispute. The doctrine does so based on largely arbitrary con-
tacts between the parties and the competing jurisdictions, and does
not permit different outcomes based on varied fact patterns. Simi-
larly, the separate entity doctrine operates as a jurisdiction-select-
ing choice of law rule by localizing a bank's obligations at the loca-
tion of the branch.
The claim that the act of state doctrine also operates primarily
as a conflict of laws rule has the support of both judges and schol-
ars. Professor Louis Henkin originated this view in the academic
literature: the "[a]ct of state [doctrine] is a special rule modifying
the ordinary rules of conflict of laws .... [It] says that the foreign
'law' (i.e., the act of state) must govern certain transactions and
that no public policy of the forum may stand in the way."6 In
Dunhill, Justice Marshall's dissent asserted that, unlike the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine "merely tells
a court what law to apply to a case. '67
66 Henkin, 6 Colum J Transnatl L at 178 (cited in note 34). See Louis Henkin, The
Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 Colum L Rev 805, 820-21
(1964); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Understanding the Act of State Doctrine's Effect, 82 Am J
Intl L 58 (1988). See also The International Rule of Law Act, Hearings on S 1434 before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 1st
Sess, 22-29 (1981) (statement of Don Wallace, Jr.). Wallace claims that the origin of the
doctrine lies with "the full faith and credit clause idea, from the interstate context." This
suggests that, just as the U.S. Constitution requires states to respect each other's laws, the
act of state doctrine requires the nation as a whole to respect the laws of foreign states.
6 425 US at 726. Justice Marshall's dissent also commanded the votes of Justices Bren-
nan and Stewart, the only members of the Sabbatino majority remaining on the Court in
1976. Marshall continued by quoting Sabbatino: "[the doctrine] 'concerns the limits for de-
termining the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law.'" Id, quoting 376 US at 438.
Monroe Leigh, while legal advisor for the State Department (immediately after the
Dunhill decision), asserted that "[m]uch of the present uncertainty derives from the Su-
preme Court's diversion of the act of state defense from its historical origins. Instead of
perpetuating the doctrine's conflict of law foundations, the Court has transformed the doc-
trine into an expression of judicial sensitivity to the conduct of foreign relations." Monroe
Leigh and Michael D. Sandler, Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 Va J
Intl L 685, 687 (1976). Interestingly, Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino also asserted that
the roots of the act of state doctrine lay in conflict of laws principles, specifically the rule
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Moreover, the territorial choice of law results of applying the
act of state doctrine are quite apparent in foreign branch deposit
cases, because the doctrine's applicability turns on situs analysis.68
"If a foreign government's actions play some part in [a dispute]
and no violation of international law is alleged, then the act of
state doctrine is essentially a choice of law rule. '6 9 When a U.S.
court deems the situs of a debt to be within the territory of the
foreign state (and the doctrine's other conditions are satisfied), the
court must decline to pass on the foreign act's validity, regardless
of which jurisdiction's law otherwise would have applied. In effect,
though not in form, a U.S. court applying the act of state doctrine
to a foreign branch deposit case simply applies the foreign law that
restricted the availability of the deposits in the first instance.
A recent Supreme Court case, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v Envi-
ronmental Tectonics Corp,70 implicitly recognized that the act of
state doctrine plays an important choice of law role. In that case, a
unanimous Court permitted a civil suit for damages arising out of
the plaintiff's failure to receive a contract with a foreign govern-
ment because the defendant had bribed foreign government offi-
cials in violation of both U.S. and foreign law. The Court held that
the act of state doctrine did not apply because the case did not call
into question the validity of a foreign sovereign's act.71 According
to the Court, the doctrine applied only if a suit would otherwise
"require[] a court to declare invalid, and thus ineffective as 'a rule
of decision for the courts of this country,' the official act of a for-
eign sovereign. '72 The Court noted that "act of state issues only
arise when a court must decide-that is, when a case turns
upon-the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. '73 Al-
though the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the doctrine's
origin or proper role,74 it implicitly recognized the doctrine's choice
that the lex loci should govern questions of title to property. 376 US at 454. See also Indus-
trial Investment Development Corp. v Mitsui & Co., 594 F2d 48, 51 (5th Cir 1979); Callejo
v Bancomer, 764 F2d 1101, 1114 (5th Cir 1985); and cases cited in Michael Gruson, The Act
of State Doctrine in Contract Cases as a Conflict-of-Laws Rule, 1988 U Ill L Rev 519.
0 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 443,
Reporters' Notes 1, 4; Gruson, 1988 U Ill L Rev at 520-29 (cited in note 67).
69 Wood, Government Involvement at 28 (cited in note 36) (antitrust context).
70 110 S Ct 701 (1990).
71 Id at 707.
71 Id at 704, quoting Ricaud, 246 US at 310 (internal citation omitted).
71 Id at 705 (emphasis in original).
7 The parties briefed and argued the applicability of several controversial exceptions to
the doctrine, all going to its purpose. But the Court found it "unnecessary [] to pursue those
inquiries, since the factual predicate for application of the act of state doctrine [did] not
exist." Id at 704.
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of law effects. The Court emphasized that the doctrine requires
U.S. courts to treat the foreign act of state as a "'rule of deci-
sion,' " and that it is not some "vague doctrine of abstention. '75
That the act of state doctrine operates as a territorial conflict
of laws rule can also be discerned from the fact that courts have
treated the doctrine much the same as they treated the First Re-
statement's territorial rules: by creating escape devices. 6 Courts
have used the doctrine's limited scope, especially the requirements
that the foreign government be recognized at the time of the trial
and that the act be done within its own borders, to carve out ex-
ceptions to it.
IV. THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINES IN
FOREIGN BRANCH DEPOSIT CASES
The courts' analytical methods in foreign branch deposit cases
share the underlying premises of the territorial principle of the
First Restatement of Conflicts and are subject to the same criti-
cisms. In fact, the problem in foreign branch deposit cases is even
more acute because the rules applied in these cases are inappropri-
ate to the problem. Courts developed the separate entity and act of
state doctrines to deal with problems completely distinct from
those presented in foreign branch deposit cases. Moreover, the sep-
arate entity doctrine rests on factual premises no longer applicable
in an age of computerized records and satellite communication.
And the act of state doctrine, as applied in these cases, relies on a
situs analysis that serves only to obscure the problems raised by
disputes over intangible property such as debt.
A. Situs Analysis as an Anachronistic Approach
Application of the ultimate liability, separate entity, and act
of state doctrines to foreign branch deposit cases results in a choice
of law analysis that suffers from the same methodological short-
comings as the First Restatement's territorial analysis. Like the
Restatement rules, the three doctrines are based on arbitrary con-
tacts, are jurisdiction-selecting (because they do not consider the
content of the laws at issue), and have generated numerous escape
devices.
76 Id at 705, quoting Ricaud, 246 US at 310.
71 See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U Pa L Rev 325,
329 n 18 (1986).
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1. Ultimate liability and separate entity doctrines.
The ultimate liability and separate entity doctrines operate as
mechanical rules that "localize" the situs of a debt or transaction.
Neither doctrine permits inquiry into other factors pertinent to
modern choice of law analysis.
The separate entity doctrine has come under strong criticism
in recent decades, especially in the federal courts. By 1980, the
dearth of recent decisions in which New York state appellate
courts had applied the doctrine encouraged a U.S. district court to
reject it outright, concluding that "New York courts would today
act in a sensible fashion" and discard the doctrine if faced directly
with the issue.77 The original perceived need for the rule no longer
exists, because major banks today use computer networks to link
their branches and provide continuously updated account
information.
In spite of the dramatic changes in the banking industry, some
claim that the separate entity doctrine should still be recognized in
international cases.78 According to this theory, the doctrine reflects
the peculiar needs of the international financial community in the
face of the threat of double liability (judgment in both a U.S. and
foreign court) for banks with foreign branches. 79 Although this
concern would seem particularly pressing in cases where the action
required by the U.S. court could result in violations of local law by
the foreign branch, such as production of account information or
freezing of assets held in foreign branch accounts, the Supreme
Court has held that the separate entity doctrine does not limit the
powers of U.S. courts in these cases.8 0
Today, the separate entity doctrine is anachronistic. It devel-
oped in response to the states' perceived interest in regulating
banks and their relations with depositors. These interests have
changed as the nature of banking has changed, requiring a reas-
sessment of the doctrine's contemporary viability. Because the
doctrine clearly affects the outcome of a choice of law analysis, it
7 Digitrex v Johnson, 491 F Supp 66, 69 (S D NY 1980). See also Det Bergenske
Dampskibsselskab v Sabre Shipping Co., 341 F2d 50, 53 (2d Cir 1965) (questioning the
doctrine's modem relevance).
7' See, for example, Heininger, 11 L & Pol Intl Bus at 942-43 (cited in note 14).
7' Banks with branches in multiple United States jurisdictions are protected from
double liability by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. US Const, Art IV, § 1, cl 1.
" United States v First National City Bank, 379 US 378, 384-85 (1965) (upholding
injunction prohibiting the transfer of assets from a foreign branch account). See also First
National City Bank v IRS, 271 F2d 616, 618 (2d Cir 1959) (requiring the production of
records of a foreign branch account).
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should be understood in relation to that effect. A court applying it
as a choice of law rule in these cases, instead of analyzing all the
factors relating to a debt in order to determine the appropriate
situs,81 must base its situs analysis on a single factor: the location
of the branch at which the deposit was made. Such a myopic ap-
proach to choice of law problems controverts modern choice of law
analysis, which requires the explicit consideration of numerous fac-
tors to determine the governing law.82 Although the ultimate liabil-
ity doctrine has not generated the same controversy, it is subject to
similar criticisms; it also operates as a jurisdiction-selecting rule
and precludes full consideration of the relevant choice of law
factors.
2. Act of state doctrine.
The act of state doctrine's situs requirement has been critical
for courts faced with foreign branch deposit cases. In Vishipco,
Trinh, Garcia, and Edelmann, the courts found that the doctrine
did not apply because the situs requirement was not met. In Perez,
the court decided the case on the act of state doctrine after finding
that the situs of the debt was in Cuba at the time of the expropria-
tion; the court did not address the doctrine's other requirements.
The problem with either applying or dispensing with the act of
state doctrine based solely on the question of situs of the debt is
the virtual impossibility of ascertaining in any meaningful and
consistent way the situs of intangible property.
While the act of state doctrine itself is probably a necessary
element of U.S. foreign relations law,83 the application of debt situs
analysis is both anachronistic and impractical in defining the act of
state doctrine's scope. 4 Unlike physical property, debt is intangi-
ble and its location is consequently more difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to discern. In the international banking context, the debt owed
SI The Fifth Circuit adopted such an "incidents of the debt" analysis in Callejo v
Bancomer, 764 F2d 1101 (5th Cir 1985). The significance of this break from traditional situs
analysis is discussed in Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion,
86 Colum L Rev 594 (1986).
82 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6.
83 Most commentators, though often critical of the courts' treatment of the doctrine,
acknowledge its necessity in some form. See, for example, Kirgis, 82 Am J Intl L 58 (cited in
note 66); Leigh and Sandler, 16 Va J Intl L 685 (cited in note 67); Wood, Government
Involvement (cited in note 36). But see Bazyler, 134 U Pa L Rev 325 (cited in note 76).
" The various tests for determining the situs of debt under the act of state doctrine are
compared in Note, 86 Colum L Rev 594 (cited in note 81). The contrary results of Perez and
Garcia demonstrate the arbitrariness of these approaches.
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by a U.S. bank by virtue of its foreign branch's activities can be
said to exist in either the United States or the foreign country,
depending on the test adopted."'
Even the First Restatement of Conflicts recognized that
[s]uch intangible things as have no position in space cannot
be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state because of any terri-
torial power of the state over them. If any state has jurisdic-
tion over an intangible thing, it is by reason of some special
circumstances which connect the intangible thing to the
state.8 6
In spite of this prescient language, the Restatement (fulfilling its
underlying premise of giving effect to the strict territoriality prin-
ciple) emphasized the state's jurisdiction over the owner of the in-
tangible property. In the case of a debt; "jurisdiction over the
debtor will also enable a state to affect the chose in action." 87 This
approach, which tracks the rule of Harris v Balk,8 has been
adopted by many courts, including the Second Circuit, in situs
analysis under the act of state doctrine. 9
The assumption that situs analysis is the only relevant ques-
tion to be asked in determining whether the act of state doctrine
applies suggests that the analysis in fact obscures a simple territo-
rial choice of law determination. If the only question is the location
of the property at issue, courts overlook the doctrine's purposes in
favor of a formalistic statement of its prerequisites. The difficulty
and controversy surrounding debt situs analysis confirm the need
for a more appropriate structure within which to analyze foreign
branch deposit cases. Many commentators have proposed alterna-
tive methods, not dependent on strict territorial principles, to de-
termine when the act of state doctrine applies.90
" For an analysis of the confusion resulting from competing tests for determining debt
situs, see Note, 86 Colum L Rev 594 (cited in note 81); Daniel C.K. Chow, Rethinking the
Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 Wash L Rev
397, 424-30 (1987).
s6 Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 51, comment a.
s7 Id, comment b.
ss 198 US 215 (1905), overruled (with respect to personal jurisdiction) by Shaffer v
Heitner, 433 US 186 (1977).
s9 Menendez v Saks & Co., 485 F2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir 1973), rev'd on other grounds as
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v Republic of Cuba, 425 US 682 (1976). The Second Circuit
endorsed Harris and Menendez in Vishipco, 660 F2d at 862.
90 See, for example, Gruson, 1988 U Ill L Rev 519 (cited in note 67); Chow, 62 Wash L
Rev 397 (cited in note 85); Note, 86 Colum L Rev 594 (cited in note 81); Comment, The Act
of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New
Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U Pa L Rev 469 (1985); Note, Foreign Sovereign Immu-
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Use of debt situs analysis by courts otherwise willing to adopt
contemporary interest analysis for the resolution of conflicts of law
poses one of the most serious problems in foreign branch deposit
cases. " The strict territorial principle inherent in traditional situs
analysis might effectively trump the choice of law analysis. Even if
the court finds the act of state doctrine inapplicable, as Edelmann
did, it still must confront two fundamentally inconsistent choice of
law theories. The result is confusing and inconsistent analyses in
foreign branch deposit cases.
Courts faced with foreign branch deposit cases cannot and
should not simply ignore the act of state doctrine. This Comment
merely argues that, when the act of state involves intangible prop-
erty such as debt, the traditional situs requirement is an inappro-
priate means by which to determine the doctrine's applicability.
Instead, courts should look to Kirkpatrick's requirement of a chal-
lenge to the validity of the foreign state's action in order to invoke
the doctrine. In addition, courts should consider whether any of
the doctrine's purposes would be furthered by applying it to the
case at issue.
B. Abandonment of Strict Territoriality
Use of the territoriality principle to resolve conflict of laws
problems has come under fire since its adoption in the First Re-
statement of Conflicts in 1934, and has been largely supplanted by
broader methods of analysis that balance the interests of those ju-
risdictions affected by the dispute. The First Restatement's the-
ory-that a universal rule should be followed in each class of cases
in order to localize multistate acts-has been criticized on at least
three grounds. First, the problem of localizing is often undertaken
arbitrarily, without explicit reference to the meaningfulness of the
contacts that are given preference. 92 Second, Beale's rules operated
without regard to the content of the laws at issue. Instead, the
rules simply "indicate the 'appropriate' jurisdictions whose laws
are to determine those controversies that, in one way or another,
have failed to respect state lines."9 3 Finally, rules based on the na-
ture of the action may classify the action in an arbitrary manner.
For example, an action described in contract might be subject to
nity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 Colum L Rev 1440 (1983).
91 See, for example, Edelmann, 861 F2d at 1294.
92 Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L J
457 (1924), reprinted in AALS Readings at 71, 74-82 (cited in note 4).
11 Cavers, 47 Harv L Rev 173 (cited in note 9).
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the law of one state, while the same action, if it could be described
in tort, would be subject to the law of another state.94
The criticism leveled at jurisdiction-selecting rules applies a
fortiori to the ultimate liability, separate entity, and act of state
doctrines. While the strict territorial approach might have ade-
quately dealt with tangible property, determining a debt's situs re-
quires a different, and much more difficult, determination. 5 The
debts at issue in branch expropriation cases have contacts with at
least two jurisdictions. Accordingly, situs analysis based merely on
mechanical attempts to localize the debt may well be impossible. 6
The jurisdictions of the bank's incorporation and/or principal
place of business, the branch's location, and the depositor's domi-
cile all have both a significant interest in the dispute's resolution
and a relevant contact with the transaction. Yet courts continue to
try to resolve the intractable problem of situs in their attempts to
apply (or refrain from applying) the ultimate liability, separate en-
tity, and act of state doctrines. Courts in foreign branch deposit
cases have failed to focus on the fact that the necessary inquiry is
one of conflict of laws and have instead submerged their choice of
law analysis beneath the cover of these doctrines.
V. AN EXPLICIT INTEREST ANALYSIS PROPOSAL
Courts need to decide these cases in a way that furthers the
interests of the affected jurisdictions, and apportions the risk of
expropriation in ways consistent with the laws of those jurisdic-
tions. Contemporary choice-of-law interest analysis provides such a
method.97 This Section first argues for a federal choice of law sys-
" See, for example, Levy v Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting, 108 Conn 333, 143 A 163,
164 (1928) (whether an accident in a rented automobile should be characterized as arising
under the terms of the rental contract or as tortious operation of an automobile). Most
critics of the First Restatement approach have mentioned this difficulty of characterization.
See, for example, A. H. Robertson, A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Con-
flict of Laws, 52 Harv L Rev 747 (1939), reprinted in AALS Readings at 144 (cited in note
4); Walter W. Cook, "Characterization" in the Conflict of Laws, 51 Yale L J 191 (1941),
reprinted in Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 211
(Harvard, 1942); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization
Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 Yale L J 743 (1941).
95 See Chow, 62 Wash L Rev at 424-25 (cited in note 85); Comment, 133 U Pa L Rev at
488-89 (cited in note 90).
" Professor Lowenfeld has gone so far as to assert that "the question of the situs of
true intangibles may not be capable of an answer at all, and yet intangibles exist and may
have value, including value in a law suit." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangi-
ble: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 NYU L Rev 102, 108 (1978).
97 In the antitrust context, Professor Wood advocates an approach similar to that sug-
gested here.
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tern, and then discusses the proper method-of applying interest
analysis in foreign branch deposit cases.
A. Source of Choice of Law Authority
A federal district court sitting in diversity must apply the con-
flict of laws rules of the state in which it sits. 8 The application of
divergent state rules may involve inconsistent methods and results,
however, especially since not all states have adopted a choice of
law jurisprudence based on interest analysis.9 While such inconsis-
tency may be acceptable within a federal system, the international
implications of foreign branch deposit cases heighten the need for
uniformity, and thus for a federal choice of law rule.
Although many foreign branch deposit cases have been
brought under diversity jurisdiction, these cases also present a fed-
eral question. The Edge Act'00 states that "all suits of a civil na-
ture at common law or in equity to which any corporation organ-
ized under the laws of the United States shall be a party, arising
out of transactions involving international or foreign banking,...
shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States
.. . .Mo This statutory basis for federal question jurisdiction al-
lows courts to avoid the potentially confusing (and internationally
embarrassing) problem of following state conflict of law rules, as
would otherwise be required under Erie10 2 and Klaxon. In Aaron
Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v Chase Manhattan Bank, the Second Circuit
invoked the Edge Act as a basis for a federal common law of con-
flict of laws in international banking cases, and used explicit inter-
est analysis to determine the law applicable to the dispute before
it. 0 3
When the problem is basically one involving choice of law, I would avoid a strict terri-
toriality approach and allow the [act of state] defense when a combination of the for-
eign state's interests and the contacts with the foreign state point to its greater regula-
tory claim.... Finally, in any case where one can assume arguendo that the foreign
government's action was legal, and a claim is still stated against the defendants before
the court, the act of state defense should be rejected.
Wood, Government Involvement at 31 (cited in note 36).
98 Klaxon Co. v Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 US 487, 496 (1941).
" See Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 Mercer
L Rev 521 (1983); Cramton, Currie, and Kay, Conflict of Laws at 226-27 nn 2-3 (cited in
note 11).
100 12 USC § 611 et seq (1988).
101 Id at § 632.
10 Erie RR. Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938).
1o 731 F2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir 1984).
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Applying a uniform federal choice of law scheme to all foreign
branch deposit cases would be justifiable even in the absence of the
Edge Act. The Supreme Court has explained that it "did not have
rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie
RR. Co. v Tompkins.... [R]ules of international law should not be
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. "104
Even if, as this Comment has suggested, the act of state doctrine
does not apply to foreign branch deposit cases, the same rationale
applies because these problems also require uniformity in interna-
tional relations. Indeed, one scholar has recently advanced a com-
prehensive argument that international choice of law should be un-
derstood as an exception to the Erie doctrine, and should be
explicitly recognized as an area for federal common law.10 5
B. The Method of Interest Analysis
A federal choice of law rule, such as that adopted in Aaron
Ferer, would allow the courts to replace outdated territorial analy-
sis in foreign branch deposit cases with a more straightforward in-
terest analysis. The interest analysis contemplated by this Com-
ment is consistent with the method first proposed by Brainerd
Currie. 10 6 Currie's theory emphasized the need to decide interna-
tional conflict of laws cases in much the same way as wholly do-
mestic cases. A court faced with a case involving multistate con-
tacts must
determine the governmental policy expressed in the law of the
forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the fo-
rum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the
assertion of an interest in the application of thai policy. This
process is essentially the familiar one of construction or inter-
104 Sabbatino, 376 US at 425. For Harlan's purposes, this provides a strong reason to
classify the doctrine under the separation of powers rubric. Monroe Leigh, however, has
formulated the logical proposition that cases dealing so intimately with foreign relations
must of necessity be governed by federal law, and concludes that international cases where
the act of state doctrine is routinely applied can and should be governed by some sort of
federal common law. Leigh and Sandler, 16 Va J Intl L at 709-12 (cited in note 67). See also
Henkin, 64 Colum L Rev at 806 (cited in note 66). Indeed, a prominent casebook on conflict
of laws includes Sabbatino as one of three cases in its subchapter entitled "Federal Com-,
mon Law." Cramton, Currie, and Kay, Conflict of Laws at 816-38 (cited in note 11).
105 Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a
Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 Iowa L Rev 165 (1988).
100 Despite widespread criticism of Beale's effort to restate the law of conflicts, no com-
mentator prior to Brainerd Currie formulated a comprehensive theory of conflict of laws to
take its place. Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U
Chi L Rev 1301, 1301-02 (1989).
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pretation. . . . If necessary, the court should similarly deter-
mine the policy expressed by the foreign law, and whether the
foreign state has an interest in the application of its policy. 07
This "governmental interests analysis" serves to distinguish "false
conflicts" (cases in which only one state has expressed an interest
that would be furthered by applying its law) from "true conflicts"
(cases in which both states have an interest in applying their law).
In the case of false conflicts, Currie recommended applying the law
of the state whose interest would be furthered, without resort to
jurisdiction-selecting rules or the escape devices that had grown up
around them.'
Currie's governmental interests analysis requires the court to
identify the interested jurisdictions and determine what interests
each has in the outcome of the case. "Interest" in this sense is not
limited to intervention in the proceedings or any other outward
manifestation of a desire for a particular outcome. According to
Currie, the jurisdiction's interests should be determined by the
"[flamiliar [process] . . . of construction or interpretation.' 1 9 The
Second Restatement of Conflicts incorporates Currie's suggestion
by listing a number of factors a court should consider in choosing
the applicable law, including "the needs of the interstate and in-
ternational systems," "the relevant policies of the forum," and
"the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative in-
terests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue."" 0
107 Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
Duke L J 171, reprinted in Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 177, 183-84
(cited in note 11).
108 Id at 180-82. If the case involved a true conflict, Currie contended that the solution
required balancing the competing interests of each state, a necessarily political endeavor
beyond the capacity and the competence of courts. Absent congressional action, Currie rec-
ommended that courts apply the law of the forum, since they are constituted as instruments
of state government. Professor Kramer has criticized this aspect of Currie's theory as incom-
patible with the basic premise that conflict of laws cases should be decided according to the
same method as other cases. According to Kramer, because a "normal" lawsuit requires the
plaintiff to plead and prove an applicable right arising under some law, conflicts cases
should be decided similarly. This approach mandates that a court determine, first, whether
the defendant can lay claim to a superior right that is also intended to apply to the facts at
issue. See Kramer, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1308-09 (cited in note 106); see also Larry Kramer,
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum L Rev 277 (1990).
209 Currie, Methods and Objectives, in Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws
at 183-84 (cited in note 11).
110 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6. The Restatement's list continues with
other factors not explicitly related to governmental interests. The court in Edelmann relied
on these factors in its choice of law analysis. 861 F2d at 1295.
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C. Accommodation of Relevant Interests
In applying interest analysis to foreign branch deposit cases,
courts should consider the interests of at least three jurisdictions
in addition to systemic interests reflected in public international
law norms. First, the United States (at both the federal and state
levels) has an interest in regulating banks that are established and
operated under its laws. Second, the foreign state in which the for-
eign branch operated may have an interest in regulating transac-
tions entered into within its jurisdiction. Finally, the state of which
the depositor is a citizen and the state in which she resides (if dif-
ferent) may each have interests in ensuring that the legitimate ex-
pectations of their citizens or residents are fulfilled. In addition to
these distinctly "governmental" interests, foreign branch deposit
cases also present the need to consider the interests of the commu-
nity of nations as a whole.
1. U.S. state and federal interests.
Interests of the United States in foreign branch deposit cases
should' be separated into interests of state and federal govern-
ments, because each typically has somewhat different concerns. In-
terests at the state level include ensuring the enforcement of bank
deposit agreements as contracts, and ensuring the fulfillment of
the legitimate expectations of the state's citizens or residents. Fed-
eral interests include conformity .with foreign policy and consis-
tency within the national bank regulatory regime. In weighing
these interests, the courts should consider whether the safety and
soundness of the federal reserve or insurance systems are at issue,
and also whether the deposit agreement itself contemplated that
U.S. law would be applied in the event of expropriation.
The state's interests in regulating the banking relationship will
likely vary among the states. American states generally have an in-
terest in enforcing contracts made by individuals domiciled within
their borders or banks chartered under their laws. The depositor
enters into a contractual agreement with the bank when she depos-
its her funds into an account. The bank assumes a debt in the
amount of the principal deposit, plus an agreed-upon rate of inter-
est. State contract law normally provides a cause of action for de-
positors whose demands for their funds have not been satisfied.11'
"I See 5B Michie on Banks and Banking § 350 (cited in note 3).
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Federal interests include ensuring a coherent and consistent
foreign policy.112 Because virtually all large banks with active for-
eign operations are members of the federal reserve system, the fed-
eral government also has a substantial interest in ensuring that
consistent, uniform rules apply to all foreign operations of national
banks.113 Federal banking statutes and regulations have tradition-
ally included specific provisions for foreign branches that treat for-
eign branches differently from their U.S. parents. 114 The role of the
Federal Reserve as arbiter of monetary policy and as lender of last
resort also implicates the U.S. interest in foreign branches as part
of a broad national economic interest. In addition, Congress, in ex-
ercising its power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,"
may have a constitutional interest in ensuring the competitiveness
of the foreign operations of U.S. banks.""
The federal government has argued recently that, to ensure
the consistency of domestic banking regulation, "sovereign risks"
such as expropriation should be borne by the depositor, while "fi-
nancial risks" such as poor lending practices or robbery of the
branch would be borne by the bank." 6 Others have challenged this
distinction, arguing that in order to preserve American preemi-
nence in international banking, courts should force U.S. banks to
honor all obligations entered into by their branches."'
Thus, in foreign branch deposit cases, the state's interests in
ensuring the enforcement of the contract between the depositor
and the bank may be in some tension with the interests of the fed-
eral government if the case presents a threat to the adequacy of
112 See, for example, United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 294 US 304, 315-18
(1936).
11' See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Citibank v Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., No
88-1260 (later reported at 110 S Ct 2034 (1990)), on writ of certiorari 1-3; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v Citibank, No 87-7685 (2d Cir), on remand
from Supreme Court 3-5, 27, 33-34.
114 See 12 USC §§ 321, 601, 1828(d)(2), and 12 CFR Pt 211 (requiring regulatory ap-
proval prior to establishment of foreign branches); 12 USC § 604 (requiring U.S. banks to
keep separate accounting for foreign branches); 12 USC § 461(b)(6) (exempting most foreign
deposits from reserve requirements); 12 USC § 1813(i)(5)(a) (exempting most foreign depos-
its from FDIC insurance assessments).
1 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3. See also 12 USC § 601 (1988) (giving the Federal Reserve
Board regulatory authority to promote "foreign commerce of the United States").
"I Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v Citibank, No 87-
7685 (2d Cir), on remand from Supreme Court 21-28.
" See Smerdresman and Lowenfeld, 64 NYU L Rev at 788-94 (cited in note 2). See
also Brief of Bank of Montreal, et al as Amici Curiae supporting Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.,
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v Citibank, No 87-7685 (2d Cir), on remand from Supreme Court 14-
28.
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the federal regulatory regime or has the potential for embarrassing
consequences to U.S. foreign policy. In such a situation, a court
must weigh the relative importance of both in light of the particu-
lar facts of the case. The adoption of a federal choice of law rule in
no way precludes the choice of state law as a rule of decision." s
Thus, a court faced with a tension between federal and state inter-
ests need not necessarily resolve it in favor of federal interests.
2. Interests of the foreign sovereign.
An expropriating government may have an interest in securing
the assets of the branch within its borders, but may have little or
no interest in the outcome of a dispute between a depositor and
the bank's home office. If the foreign government has already
achieved its purposes by nationalizing the assets held by foreign
institutions, it may be indifferent to whether the bank's home of-
fice is required to honor its deposit agreements. The court's deci-
sion will neither deplete the foreign government's treasury nor
lessen the impact of the expropriatory decree." 9
A suit between a depositor, currently residing in the United
States, and the U.S. bank's home office involves two parties who,
for the purposes of the dispute, have no contemporaneous connec-
tion with the foreign country. The plaintiff's claim in such a case is
not that her foreign funds should be repaid by the foreign branch
or its successor in interest, the foreign government (if that were so,
she would have brought suit in the foreign court), but that the
home office itself owes her a debt which it should repay. 20
Generally, the foreign government's expropriation decree will
seek to reach no further than the nation's borders. Certainly the
government could not reasonably have expected that American
courts would assist in the enforcement of such a decree, given the
U.S. public policy against such orders. Consequently, the choice
between U.S. and foreign law in many foreign branch deposit cases
may present what Currie termed a "false conflict," since the
United States has numerous interests in enforcing the deposit
agreement and the foreign government has no discernible compet-
118 See Aaron Ferer, 731 F2d at 120-21 (applying federal common law choice of law
approach to conclude that New York substantive law governs).
11' The interest of the foreign government may be more substantial in the case of ex-
change controls, where an ongoing relationship exists between the government and the
branch. See Wells Fargo, 852 F2d 657.
110 If the depositor is a national of the expropriating government, that government
might have a greater interest in enforcing its economic laws and regulations on the
individual.
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ing interest.' 2 '
Because the imposition of liability on the home office may re-
sult in the establishment of fewer foreign branches, the foreign
government may have an economic interest in preventing home of-
fice liability. Such an interest is attenuated, however; the act of
expropriation itself provides a strong disincentive to banks consid-
ering opening foreign branches in that country, and the additional
cost of liability to those depositors who can make their way to U.S.
courts represents only a marginal increase in the loss suffered from
expropriation.
3. Systemic interests of the international community.
In addition to the particular interests of the United States and
foreign governments, the peculiar circumstances of foreign branch
deposit cases implicate interests of the world community. To the
extent that an expropriation may have violated norms of public
international law, such a factor would weigh against choosing for-
eign law. The perceived effect on the diplomatic and economic re-
lations between the United States and the foreign government
might also bear on the choice of law analysis.
As members of the community of nations, sovereign states are
governed by the norms of public international law.122 A sovereign
has an undisputed right to expropriate assets within its territory
and to impose restrictions on the export of goods, including foreign
currency. 2 ' Although some compensation is probably required, the
'international legal norms governing the compensation due to a
state whose nationals' assets have been expropriated remain a sub-
ject of significant controversy. Many expropriations have involved
no compensation at all. 12 4
Although Sabbatino declined to invoke an "illegality excep-
tion" to the act of state doctrine, the Court indicated that it de-
clined to apply international legal standards to the Cuban govern-
ment's expropriations only because there was "disagreement as to
[the] relevant international law standards.' 25 The Court held that:
121 There may still be a "true conflict" between U.S. federal and state interests.
222 See Louis Henkin, et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 4-13 (West, 2d ed
1987).
123 In the absence of any treaty or other agreement forbidding expropriation. Id at
1107.
124 See the discussion in Sabbatino of the dispute regarding the validity of expropria-
tion under international law standards. 376 US at 428-32. The Cuban and Vietnamese de-
crees both involved expropriation without compensation.
125 376 US at 430.
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the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time
of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the
complaint alleges that the taking violates customary interna-
tional law. 2 "
This construction depreciates the importance of customary inter-
national law in favor of "positive" or treaty law, but it does create
an exception to the act of state doctrine when the act is alleged to
violate a treaty or other multinational agreement.2 7
Although foreign branch deposit cases cannot be decided
solely by reference to public international law, the needs of the
international system should be acknowledged in the interest
calculus. Abandoning the current territorial approach to foreign
branch deposit cases would permit an explicit consideration of
whether the U.S. court would give effect to a taking of property
accomplished in violation of international legal norms. This Com-
ment's suggestion that the act of state doctrine may not be impli-
cated in these cases leads to the conclusion that this area of the
law is ripe for development of international legal standards by do-
mestic courts.2 8 Many scholars already contend that the act of
state doctrine should be construed narrowly to allow U.S. courts to
contribute to the development of customary international law.12 9
116 Id at 428 (emphasis added).
127 For a discussion of the treaty exception, see Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic
Courts in the International Legal Order 72-112 (Syracuse, 1964) (arguing that U.S. courts
should not interfere in the domestic affairs of foreign nations); J. Anthony Kline, An Exam-
ination of the Competence of National Courts to Prescribe and Apply International Law:
The Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1 USF L Rev 49, 81-93 (1966) (criticizing Falk's thesis). For
a review of the treaty exception's reception in the courts, see Bazyler, 134 U Pa L Rev at
371-72 (cited in note 76). For an example of the treaty exception, see Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co. v Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F2d 422, 427-
28 (6th Cir 1984).
12 See Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts at 112-14 (cited in note 127).
22 See, for example, Jay L. Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflict of Laws, and the
Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 Tex Intl L J 71, 74-75 (1990) (act of state and
choice of law are but two aspects of the larger problem of regulation of transnational con-
duct); Wood, Government Involvement at 31 (cited in note 36) (act of state should be nar- .
rowly construed when a violation of international law is alleged in order to allow domestic
court decisions to contribute to the body of international law).
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D. Interest Analysis in Operation
The facts of the Vietnamese cases provide an illustration of
how interest analysis would operate in foreign branch deposit
cases. The foreign interest in such a case, brought by a U.S. resi-
dent against a U.S. bank's home office, is very small. The relation-
ship between the banks and the Vietnamese government had effec-
tively ended before the expropriation decree was issued. Once the
banks closed their branches and evacuated their personnel, the for-
eign government's interests in the outcome of litigation in the
United States became negligible.
Systemic interests in such a case are also relatively small. Al-
though the fact that the government was established by armed
conflict could be a violation of international law, it might also be
defended on the basis of self-determination. Importantly, the
United States did not and has not recognized the new government
of Vietnam.'130 A failure to give effect to the Vietnamese expropria-
tion decree would not embarrass the U.S. in its foreign relations,
because U.S. foreign policy toward Vietnam is premised on the
idea that the Vietnamese government has no sovereign
authority.131
The act of state doctrine would not apply to such a case for at
least two reasons. First, under Kirkpatrick, the attempt to recover
a debt from the bank's home office would not challenge the validity
of the Vietnamese decree. Second, under the recognition require-
ment enunciated in Sabbatino and Sokoloff, the actions of an un-
recognized government are not afforded the presumption of valid-
ity under the act of state doctrine; nor would they potentially
embarrass the executive branch's conduct of foreign relations.
A U.S. state has obvious interests in enforcing contracts be-
tween banks and depositors in wholly domestic situations; the in-
volvement of a foreign branch should not diminish this interest.
Admittedly, if the plaintiff moves to the state after the expropria-
tion, as in Trinh and Vishipco, this interest is less immediate.
Moreover, as argued above, no important U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests are implicated here. Whether the federal interests in the
safety and soundness of-the banking regulatory regime are genu-
130 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 202,
Reporters' Note 6; Republic of Vietnam v Pfizer, 556 F2d 892 (8th Cir 1977). Recognition is
important in international relations and is determined by individual nations. See Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 202-05.
... This analysis follows the Sabbatino Court's emphasis on recognition at the time of
suit as a requirement for invocation of the act of state doctrine. See 376 US at 428.
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inely threatened by such suits presents a difficult question that
courts have not addressed in previous cases."3 2 Although such an
interest would seem quite strong if actually implicated by suits like
these, a court would still have to determine whether it preempts
state contract law.133 Without additional information, it is impossi-
ble to determine how suits such as Trinh and Vishipco would af-
fect the federal regulatory scheme. At first blush, however, the
state interest in enforcing contracts weighs quite heavily and
should be overcome only by evidence of real risk to safety and
soundness.
Thus, interest analysis would probably lead to the application
of state contract law to decide the dispute in cases like Trinh and
Vishipco. Of course, courts engaged in the balancing required by
interest analysis could reach different outcomes. The method
demonstrated here nonetheless has the distinct advantages of be-
ing more methodologically direct and consistent than the ap-
proaches used by courts in recent foreign branch deposit cases.
CONCLUSION
The current law governing suits to recover foreign branch de-
posits suffers from two main problems. First, the courts use the ill-
suited doctrines of ultimate liability, separate entity, and act of
state to solve a conflict of laws problem. Second, the choice of law
results of those doctrines exhibit all the defects of the now-discred-
ited territorial approach to conflict of laws analysis. International
banking law should recognize the futility of using debt situs analy-
sis to localize transactions with multinational contacts.
An explicit investigation into the governmental interests im-
plicated in the actual case would permit courts to make reasoned
decisions regarding the law governing these types of transactions.
It would also foster rules of decision specifically tailored to the
problems of foreign branch deposits. The development of rational
conflicts rules to be applied in foreign branch deposit cases would
increase predictability (at least as to the method for determining
the applicable law), and enhance depositors' and bankers' invest-
ment decisions. The current practice of resorting to escape devices
"' This will be an issue in the Second Circuit's consideration of the Wells Fargo case
on remand. See sources cited in notes 113, 117.
"I See Brief of Bank of Montreal, et al as Amici Curiae supporting Wells Fargo Asia
Ltd., Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v Citibank, No 87-7685 (2d Cir), on remand from Supreme
Court 14-18.
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to avoid the implications of imported doctrines can only hinder the
flow of funds otherwise encouraged by foreign branch banking.
